

## Message Text

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21

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

DRC-01 /161 W

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R 041741Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1595

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T BONN 5539

SHAPE FOR INTAF

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, MILI, MARR, GW, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SOME MILITARY ASPECTS.

BEGIN SUMMARY: SOME MILITARY ASPECTS OF MBFR AROSE DURING APRIL 2 DISCUSSION OF VISITING ACDA COUNSELLOR NEWHOUSE WITH GENERAL BRANDT, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S ACTING DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY POLICY AND PLANS. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON QUESTION OF WARNING TIME AND PRE-POSITIONING OF EQUIPMENT. END SUMMARY

1. BRANDT SAID THE MAJOR GERMAN OBJECTIVE IN MBFR IS THE ATTAINMENT OF A COMMON CEILING. ONLY SUCH AN  
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END RESULT WOULD PRODUCE A TRULY SIGNIFICANT AND

FAVORABLE CHANGE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. BRANDT SAID THAT, FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEEK IN MBFR AN ENHANCEMENT OF WESTERN WARNING TIME; (HE NOTED THE MC-161 DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC IN NATO BRUSSELS.) BRANDT SAID THIS WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT MILITARILY IF REDUCTIONS WERE TO RESULT IN AT LEAST UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE WEST.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION, BRANDT SAID THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE PRE-POSITIONING IN THE NGA OF EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH US FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN IN MBFR. HE SAID THE FRG NATURALLY HOPED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO TAKE THEIR EQUIPMENT OUT OF THE REDUCTION AREA ALONG WITH WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES. HOWEVER, BRANDT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE A MAJOR DISADVANTAGE TO THE WEST SHOULD THE SOVIETS, IN THE END, BE PERMITTED ALSO TO PRE-POSITION SUCH EQUIPMENT IN THE NGA. THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTRY ASSUMED THAT, SHOULD A SOVIET TANK ARMY BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE GDR IT WOULD BE STATIONED IN THE RUSSIAN WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS AND WOULD BE MAINTAINED ON A COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL BASIS. IF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY'S EQUIPMENT WAS MOTH-BALLED IN THE GDR, NEW EQUIPMENT WOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE TANK ARMY IN THE WMD'S. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE TANK ARMY TO RETURN FULLY EQUIPPED, WHETHER OR NOT THEIR PREVIOUS EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN MOTH-BALLED IN THE NGA. IN ANY EVENT, BRANDT EMPHASIZED THAT THE GERMANS ATTACH FAR MORE IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING US PRE-POSITIONED EQUIPMENT IN THE NGA THAN TO DENYING THAT RIGHT TO THE SOVIET TANK ARMY.

4. BRANDT SAID THESE GERMAN CONCLUSIONS ARE BASED LARGELY ON SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS THAN APPEARED IN THE SO-CALLED PENTAGON STUDY. HE SAID THE US HAD UTILIZED THE 30/23 DAY MODEL; I.E., THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD NEVER LAUNCH A MAJOR AGGRESSION UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY A FULL BUILD-UP OF ALL NECESSARY

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DIVISIONS, AND THAT THE WEST COULD EXPECT TO KNOW OF THE SOVIET BUILD-UP 23 DAYS BEFORE THE ACTUAL AGGRESSION WAS LAUNCHED.

5. BRANDT SAID THE GERMAN (AND GENERAL WEST EUROPEAN) VIEW IS THAT SUCH A SOVIET OPERATION WOULD BE LAUNCHED WITH TWO ECHELONS. THE SOVIET ATTACK COULD COME AFTER BUILD-UP OF THE FIRST ECHELON WAS CONCLUDED--SOME 59

OF THE TOTAL 86 WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS, OF WHICH 30 OR 31 ARE DIVISIONS IN THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND POLAND. GIVEN THESE PREMISES, THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE MORE CORRECT MODEL WOULD BE 10/3 DAYS.

6. BRANDT SAID THIS LATTER MODEL OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON GERMAN AND EUROPEAN THINKING CONCERNING BOTH DEFENSE POLICY AND MBFR. FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT, IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO SEEK TO ENHANCE THE DEGREE OF WARNING TIME BEYOND THE THREE DAYS. BRANDT SAID THE DEFENSE MINISTRY THEREFORE ATTACHES SOME IMPORTANCE TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR TO DOUBLE THE WARNING TIME FROM 3 TO 6 DAYS.

7. IN CLOSING, BRANDT EMPHASIZED THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS RELATED SOLELY TO THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE OF MBFR. HE CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME OF THESE MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPROMISED OR SET ASIDE TO SOME EXTENT IF AN OVERALL IMPROVED POLITICAL SITUATION COULD RESULT FROM THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE BRANDT ACKNOWLEDGED THE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATION, HE SAID THE DEFENSE MINISTRY WOULD DO ITS BEST TO ASSURE THAT THE ABOVE AND OTHER MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATION WOULD BE TAKEN SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT. HILLENBRAND

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 04 APR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: SOME MILITARY ASPECTS. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOME MILITARY ASPECTS OF MBFR AROSE  
**TAGS:** PARM, MILI, MARR, GE, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005